Samuel Untermyer
(Courtesy American Jewish Archives)

Felix M. Warburg
(Courtesy American Jewish Archives)
Under other circumstances, inviting a foreign ambassador to speak—and flying his country’s flag—would be a diplomatic courtesy. But in a crowded meeting of the United German Societies of New York on September 18, 1933, the issue was a heated one. The ambassador, Hans Luther, represented Hitler’s Germany, and the flag in question bore the swastika. Unfortunately for the opposition, pro-Nazi sympathizers had packed the meeting hall, and the motion to invite Luther was accepted. In response, the Jewish delegates at the meeting immediately staged a walkout. Before departing, one of them expressed the reason for his disgust: “German Jews … have not refused the [German] flag. The flag has refused them.” In subsequent weeks, Jewish organizations formally withdrew from the United German Societies, and the split became a permanent one.¹

Historians of early-twentieth-century immigrant history have only recently begun to explore overlaps between German-American and Jewish-American narratives.² Even terminology presents an obstacle, as illustrated by the loaded term “German Jews.” Does it refer to all Jews from German-speaking Europe, those who belonged to German-American organizations, or those who adhered to German traditions? In other cases, the term has been even more subjective, suggesting affluent, assimilated Jews, the proverbial “old immigrants,” who looked down on newcomers.³ Indeed, much work can be done to sort through these connotations and to shed light on the connections between the two immigrant groups.

In helping to link the stories of Germans and Jews in America, it is helpful to examine German identity among individuals commonly thought of as Jewish leaders. Samuel Untermyer and Felix Warburg, Jewish Americans of German background, make for good case studies, especially in their respective responses to Nazism. While Untermyer and Warburg pursued starkly different strategies in reacting to Nazi Germany, there are important similarities in their stories. Both the American-born Untermyer and the immigrant Warburg had a demonstrable record of German immigrant nationalism prior to 1933, and subsequently they acted in the name of a nation that, they argued, had been hijacked by the Hitler movement. In addition, their centrality in the world of Jewish philanthropy placed them in the middle of American Jewish debates over how to combat Nazism. Finally, their stories demonstrate the ongoing—and increasing—difficulties of traditionally German leadership within the larger Jewish community in the mid-twentieth century.⁴
The Jewish-German-American World

As with other immigrant groups, it is easy to oversimplify the Jewish-American story. But while scholars have rightly questioned the labeling of pre- and post-1880 waves of Jewish immigrants as “German” and “eastern European,” there is no denying that German culture predominated in nineteenth-century American Jewry. A majority of the 250,000 pre-1880 arrivals came from German-speaking lands, and many of them felt at home within German-American organizations. Social distinctions persisted between Jewish and gentile German-Americans, but many nineteenth-century Jewish organizations operated in the German language. Reform Judaism, which originated in Germany, also found broad support in the United States.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, during the Progressive Era, urban-based reformers sought to apply professional expertise and organizing to better manage American cities and improve the lives of their inhabitants. In this context, many Jewish organizations hoped to Americanize newcomers, in part to prevent an antisemitic backlash that could threaten their social positions. By this time, however, a growing number of eastern European immigrants—a majority of the 2.5 million post-1880 arrivals—were challenging the older leadership and its “assimilationist” aspirations. These developments had already begun to strain the German foundations of Jewish organizational life well before Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor in January 1933.

Within German-American communities, gentile as well as Jewish, the twentieth century brought a multitude of problems. For decades, “mass culture,” as exemplified by modern advertising and forms of entertainment that reached broader portions of the population, had pulled individuals from ethnic affinities into a larger, more national identity. At the same time, social identities based on race rather than on countries of origin had sapped the strength of German ethnic consciousness. Worse yet, a hostile atmosphere during World War I convinced many Americans of German descent to shed their ethnic identities. To counter these forces, German-American organizations in the twentieth century pushed for ethnic revitalization. Their efforts culminated in the First German-American National Congress, held in Philadelphia in 1932, which pledged to re-energize German communities. The rise of Nazism shattered whatever unity that movement helped to create, however, as German organizations staked positions ranging from strong support of Hitler to active protest against him. The divisions were especially sharp between Jewish and gentile German-Americans, as the example of the New York societies has demonstrated. Even avowedly apolitical groups such as the Philadelphia-based Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation faced rapid declines in Jewish membership and donations. Nazism, like demographic shifts and assimilation, sent shockwaves through the German-American organizational world.
Samuel Untermyer and Felix Warburg were part of that turbulent world. Untermyer was an American-born attorney who placed himself at the head of the effort to fight Nazism through an international boycott. Warburg, an immigrant tied to the European and American banking worlds, pursued a much more cautious strategy in response to the Third Reich. Despite their different trajectories, both stories reflect important trends in American ethnic life, particularly among Jews.

**Samuel Untermyer as a German-American**

Untermyer was prominent in New York politics and philanthropy in the interwar period. Born in Virginia in 1858, Untermyer started a highly successful law firm in New York City with his half-brother, Randolph Guggenheimer. Untermyer also became active in the Democratic Party, supporting antitrust and regulatory efforts by both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. He sometimes felt spurned by the Democratic Party, however, since he never received a national political appointment.12

Untermyer's frustration with the Democratic Party was one reason why he increasingly shifted his attention toward Jewish organizations. In the early 1920s Untermyer established himself as a philanthropist and a key member of several important Jewish groups. In the wake of World War I, he supported the international relief efforts of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), as well as various Jewish charities within the United States. Also in the early 1920s, he served as the president of the Keren Hayesod, or Palestine Foundation Fund. The American-born Untermyer considered himself a cultural, rather than political, Zionist. As an Americanized German Jew, he helped the Keren Hayesod collect donations from a larger spectrum of the American Jewish community, especially those who shied from political Zionism. Beyond this work, a vast array of Jewish societies valued Untermyer’s financial and public support.13

It is also significant, if often overlooked, that Untermyer identified himself as a German-American. Both he and his wife, Minnie Carl of St. Louis, had been raised in immigrant households, and his in-laws boasted of their friendship with the late senator and German-American hero, Carl Schurz.14 Untermyer supported the German Theater in New York and was a member of Freundschaft, an ethnic fraternity in the city. In 1916 he served on the memorial committee for the late Herman Ridder, publisher of the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, the nation’s largest German-language daily. He vacationed in Imperial Germany, often patronizing German ocean liners. These activities indicate that Germanness was no small part of his identity, and one can infer from his active participation that other German-American leaders regarded him as a peer.15

Untermyer’s business connections to Germany often blended with his affinities for that country, even during the period of American neutrality in
World War I. Prior to 1914, his law firm had represented a number of German-American brewing companies. After the outbreak of the war, Untermyer joined other German-Americans in regarding British and French propaganda with suspicion. While his wife, Minnie, coordinated efforts to buy milk for German babies, Samuel consulted with German investors in the United States and even attempted to broker a deal to put the *New York Sun* into the hands of German propagandists. In these efforts, Untermyer left a record of interactions with George Sylvester Viereck, a virulently pro-German writer and paid German propagandist. He also met with Heinrich Albert, a Reich diplomat who was publicly exposed as a coordinator of German espionage in the United States. While the *Sun* deal fell apart, it created suspicions about Untermyer’s loyalty once the United States entered the war. A lack of hard evidence ultimately enabled him to dodge the accusations, however. Untermyer enthusiastically supported the American war effort after April 1917, another move that helped him to counter questions about his loyalties.

Untermyer’s advocacy for Germany and German-Americans continued after the armistice. He considered himself a Wilsonian, but he denounced the “spirit of conquest and robbery” that had shaped the Versailles Treaty. Viereck—who would be prosecuted in the 1940s as a Nazi agent—entreated Untermyer in 1914 to finance his *Fatherland* magazine, which was dedicated to countering pro-Allied sentiment. While it is unclear whether Untermyer provided monetary assistance, he did periodically contribute articles decrying anti-German attitudes after 1919. Untermyer also maintained business interests within Germany. He owned shares in a German utility company and real estate holdings outside Berlin. The freezing of these assets by the Nazi government after 1933 later served as a concrete representation of the severing of Untermyer’s connections to Germany.

**Felix Warburg as a German-American**

Unlike Untermyer, Warburg had grown up in Germany; however, the two men’s careers bore similarities. The Moritz Warburg family had built up the M.M. Warburg banking firm in Hamburg, Germany, in the late nineteenth century. By the time of Mortiz’s death in 1910, three of his sons had gained prominence in transatlantic business. The eldest, Max, headed the family firm, sat on the board of the Hamburg-America Steamship Line, and became a financial adviser to Kaiser Wilhelm II. Paul, a year younger, married Nina Loeb, connecting him to the Kuhn, Loeb and Company banking firm in New York. He moved to the United States in 1902 and became a U.S. citizen nine years later, although he still spent considerable time in Hamburg. Felix, originally trained in the diamond and pearl business, had moved to the United States in 1894 and married the daughter of Jacob Schiff, a Manhattan banker and fellow German-Jewish immigrant. Felix received a Kuhn, Loeb partnership in
1897. He quickly became a New York socialite and an active philanthropist. Geography now divided the brothers, but they forged links between Kuhn, Loeb and M.M. Warburg, empowering both companies.20

By 1914, Paul Warburg found his Germanness to be a liability as he worked to reform the American monetary system. Within a year of his arrival in New York in 1902, Paul sketched a proposal for a central banking system that eventually evolved into the Federal Reserve. He served on the Federal Reserve Board in 1914, despite the fact that he had become a target of nativist anger. One congressman, for example, opposed his nomination to the Federal Reserve on the grounds that he was “a Jew, a German, a banker and an alien.” Although Paul was a naturalized citizen who worked actively to Americanize, his transatlantic connections were never far from view. Paul helped to direct the American war economy in 1917 while his older brother Max filled the same role for the German Reich. Such connections later provided fodder for Nazi propagandists, who accused the brothers of orchestrating both the start and the end of the Great War “in the interest of the Jewish race.”21

Felix, three years Paul’s junior, was more outspoken and more active in social circles. He took U.S. citizenship in 1900, quickly becoming comfortable in American society. He joined his father-in-law, Jacob Schiff, in reform work that emphasized Americanization. In turn-of-the-century New York, they sponsored the Henry Street Settlement and joined the Educational Alliance, an organization that catered to poor Jews. His charitable work became “so diverse as to defy easy summary,” as biographer Ron Chernow explains, but a major realm of activity was international relief. In 1906 he joined Schiff in co-founding the American Jewish Committee (AJC), an elite philanthropic organization. He also became the chair of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), created in 1914 to provide support for victims of the European war. Warburg’s reputation as a “democratic aristocrat” helped the JDC to soften animosities between established and recently arrived Jews. He increasingly devoted his time to the JDC, and his stature as a philanthropist increased accordingly.22

By 1917, Warburg had also established himself within the German-American community. He became a member of the Chamber of German-American Commerce; the German Society of New York, a philanthropic society; and the Germanist Society of America, dedicated to preserving German culture in the United States. Like Untermyer, he demonstrated sympathy for the German Reich. In 1915 he donated funds anonymously to the Hilfsverein deutscher Frauen (German Women’s Aid Organization) and other groups that supported German “war sufferers.” As a partner at Kuhn, Loeb, he helped prevent the company from issuing a loan to the Allies in 1915, a decision that brought scorn from pro-Allied elements of the American press and public.23

Following American entry into the war in April 1917, Warburg moved quickly to support the U.S. war effort. He devoted time and money to the
United Service Organization, donated his own resources to the war effort, and ostentatiously reduced his level of consumption. In 1918, his brother Paul gave in to growing criticism of his German ancestry, resigning from the Federal Reserve Board. Upset by the treatment of Germans in the United States, both brothers became active in the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, dedicated to preserving German-American heritage. Felix, meanwhile, threw himself into the work of the JDC and added investment in Palestine to his already massive record of philanthropy.24

Responses to National Socialism

Immediately following Hitler’s accession to power in January 1933, Jewish organizations in America sought a proper response to a regime suffused with antisemitism. By March, a movement was underway to mount an economic boycott of Nazi Germany. When the divided American Jewish Congress initially hesitated on the matter, the Jewish War Veterans assumed leadership of the movement. Soon, however, the momentum passed to organizations founded specifically to promote the boycott, foremost among them the American League for the Defense of Jewish Rights (ALDJR).25 Jewish leaders diverged on the subject, and Untermyer and Warburg were no exception.

Untermyer actively supported the anti-Nazi movement in America, and he became the head of the ALDJR. He now openly expressed regret for his own pro-German sentiments prior to World War I. As he looked back, he recalled that “German-Jewish advisers” like himself had naively worked for peace, in contrast to the “Hitler–von Tirpitz type” who drove toward war in both the 1910s and 1930s.26 In another attempt to reconcile his older views with his new stance, he compared Nazi propaganda to the “British-French war fables” of 1914,
referring to the Allied campaigns to exaggerate and, in some cases, fabricate German atrocities to steer American public opinion. Americans would no longer accept foreign propaganda at face value. “We … have learned our lesson in the ways of counteracting that kind of poison,” Untermyer declared in 1933.27

His speeches against Nazism also reflected the sense of betrayal that he and other Jews of German background felt in the 1930s, both in Europe and the United States. Untermyer cited a long record of Jewish military service in Germany, as well as Jewish contributions to culture, science, and business, all of which were ignored by “the blind bigotry and fanaticism of the Hitler platform.”28 Undoubtedly, many German-American Jews shared his sentiments, harboring “the strongest feeling of sympathy toward the German people” alongside a “corresponding feeling of revulsion” against the Nazis. As one who had considered himself German, Untermyer was the ideal spokesperson for the ALDJR’s position that the German people were unhappy under Hitler and could be persuaded, through economic pressure, to remove him from power.29

Untermyer sometimes used his German background and perspective to lend credibility to the anti-Nazi movement. In a May 1933 speech, he shared his thoughts on his “old friend,” Herman Metz, who represented the I.G. Farben corporation in the United States and who worked to improve the Nazis’ image abroad. Having talked privately with Metz, Untermyer declared that “Mr. Metz knows what he has seen with his own eyes in Germany.” Sadly, he said, Metz’s economic interest compelled him to defend the Nazis, rather than speak the truth. Citing his personal relationship with Metz provided Untermyer with a unique means of refuting pro-German
propaganda. This view of Metz also reinforced Untermeyer’s assertions about the importance of economic pressure.30

Warburg, too, loathed Nazism, but his reaction was notably different than that of Untermeyer. Warburg was a member of the traditional—and stereotypically “German Jewish”—philanthropic elite. He was a prominent officer of the AJC, founded in 1906 to aid victims of Russian pogroms. For the affluent leaders of the committee, philanthropy had long provided a means of steering Jewish communities and Americanizing newcomers. The committee was so effective in shaping Jewish community life that one scholar has described it as a “self-perpetuating oligarchy.”31

Warburg had long favored assimilation but still retained an affinity for his country of birth. As a result of Nazism, he became ambivalent about German-American cultural life. His relationship with the German Society of New York illustrates this ambivalence. When the charitable organization invited Warburg to serve on its 150th Anniversary Committee in 1934, he declined, saying that he could not “join a committee on which I may meet some people whose attitude toward the present German Government may be more favorable than mine.” He did, however, maintain his membership in the society.32

Warburg took a quieter, more cautious stance toward Nazi Germany than did Untermeyer. This attitude stemmed, in large part, from his desire not to draw attention to his relatives in Europe. His brother Max, after all, was trying to maintain both the family firm and his own physical well-being in Hamburg. As a result, Felix refused to comment publicly on reports of anti-Jewish violence in the spring of 1933. In April, when Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht came to the United States, other leaders of the AJC asked Warburg whether they should meet with the German official. Warburg’s secretary replied that the committee should do so but that Warburg himself could not be involved, and his name was to be kept out of any communication. A few years later he sponsored refugee professors through the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, but only with the understanding that his name never appear in its records.33

For Warburg and Untermeyer, and for their respective organizations, the campaign to boycott imports from Germany remained a heated issue throughout the 1930s. Untermeyer, president of the ALDJR after May 1933, became the boycott movement’s most visible spokesperson. The ALDJR saw his status as an American-born, affluent figure as a way to broaden its appeal, both within and beyond the United States. The calculation seems to have met some success, as a federation of pro-boycott groups chose Untermeyer to appeal their case before the League of Nations in the summer of 1933.34 As Untermeyer often reiterated, the boycott was not simply the most effective means of protest, but the only means. “There is no longer a free press or freedom of speech in Germany,” he explained. “If world opinion does not reach [the Germans], there is just one way, and
only one.” Economic pressure would “reach the masses” and force a repudiation of Nazism.35

Untermyer also insisted on the boycott becoming more than a “Jewish” movement. He characterized it as “the spontaneous uprising of outraged civilization against [the] ‘Mad Dog of Europe.’” Indeed, the need for broad—especially gentile—support convinced Untermyer to change the group’s name to the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights (NSANL) in November 1933.36 The movement spread beyond New York, with the Jewish War Veterans and its women’s auxiliaries helping to disseminate information. The American Jewish Congress finally joined the boycott in August 1933, although it and the Jewish Labor Committee eventually created the Joint Boycott Council as a rival to the NSANL.37 Differences of personality and strategy, including Untermyer’s autocratic leadership style, fueled divisions, but by 1937 the NSANL’s Interstate Conference received progress reports from chapters in Detroit, Cleveland, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and other localities.38

The AJC, whose leadership included Warburg, remained a vocal opponent of the boycott effort, although there is evidence that he initially considered lending his support. He mused in one letter that the German people might change their tone if “their pocketbooks [were] attacked by their own foolishness.” But observing the situation from Germany, where any Nazi retaliation over the boycott would actually occur, his brother Max disagreed. His impassioned pleas against confrontation convinced Felix and the AJC to withhold their support. Meanwhile, the JDC, of which Felix was president, also decided against the boycott. Comparing itself to the Red Cross, it cited a need to remain apolitical.39 In effect, the AJC, the JDC, and B’nai B’rith became the leading organizations that opposed, or at least avoided, the boycott.40

The AJC summarized its case against the boycott in August 1933. The group believed that economic action would provide a pretext for intensified persecution. It also feared alienating Christians, antagonizing German-Americans, and fueling global antisemitism. Instead, the committee favored using personal
contacts to exert pressure on prominent Reich officials and citizens. One memo even suggested that, in private conversations with Germans, committee members cite the boycott as evidence that the Nazis should mitigate their policies. In this way, it noted, even the reckless boycott movement “may be utilized for a good purpose.”

The turbulent relationship between Untermyer and Warburg reflected that of the organizational world as a whole. The two had not always been amicable—Untermyer had antagonized the Warburgs in 1912 by investigating the Kuhn, Loeb firm as part of an alleged “Money Trust”—but in the 1920s they had found common ground in that both considered themselves non-Zionists in the political sense. Committed simply to supporting Jewish cultural development in Palestine, Warburg joined Untermyer’s Keren Hayesod, and Untermyer supported Warburg’s JDC. Even in the 1930s, Untermyer was at times willing to acknowledge the Warburg family’s precarious circumstances. “I suppose we shall continue to differ as to the policy of the boycott,” he wrote Warburg in 1935, “but your position and that of your people in Germany is quite understandable.” At the same time, however, Untermyer cut off his donations to the JDC, citing its opposition to the boycott.

In public, Untermyer attacked the AJC and B’nai B’rith for their inaction. He undoubtedly had people like Warburg in mind when he railed against those who opposed his movement:

[W]hen our persecuted, defenseless people are knocked over the head with a club, … these self-constituted leaders retaliate with a cry of pain and strike back by shaking a feather-duster in the faces of their tormentors, and pass eloquent resolutions of protest and appeal, but refuse to use the only effective weapon at hand, by way of defense.

In turn, when Untermyer criticized Secretary of State Cordell Hull for ignoring evidence of Nazi propaganda in America, the AJC publicly denounced Untermyer as irresponsible.

The rejection of public action by Warburg and his associates paralleled that of the United States government. William Dodd, the American ambassador to Germany until 1938, was an unabashed critic of the Nazis, yet he opposed the boycott as counterproductive to “the helps [sic] we apply quietly and unofficially.” Secretary Hull advised President Roosevelt to keep his distance from boycott leaders to prevent any suspicion that the White House supported their actions. Critics of the Warburg family read much into this inaction. Because James Warburg, Felix’s nephew, was an economic advisor to the Roosevelt administration, some detractors even concluded that the Warburgs were shaping official policy on Germany. Thus, at the exact same time that the Nazis blamed the Warburgs for the Versailles Treaty, the Bolshevik Revolution, and other events,
the family came under fire in the United States for being appeasers of Hitler.\textsuperscript{47} Such was the price of remaining quiet in a noisy, ideologically polarized era.

Despite his cautious public stance, Warburg did commit to a range of activity to aid German Jews. After hearing an account of persecution in April 1933, he declared:

\begin{quote}
I am sufficiently enraged, and so are all German Americans, even the Christian ones, … to take some drastic steps, unfriendly to Germany and seemingly unfriendly to M.M. [Warburg], in order to get [the Jews] out of the undignified position in which they find themselves.
\end{quote}

To this end, he supported the philanthropic activity of his brother, Max, who remained in Germany. Max chaired the \textit{Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden} (Aid Society for German Jews) and cofounded several other groups to provide mutual aid within Germany and to sponsor resettlement. These aid organizations even tried—with negligible results—to lobby Reich officials on behalf of Jewish communities.\textsuperscript{48}

Responding to criticism of his brother for remaining in Germany, Felix Warburg insisted that the family was trying to aid those unable to leave. The JDC aligned itself with such efforts. In a 1933 letter, its fundraising chair described its goals as “maintaining [German Jewish] institutions, keeping up their morale and preventing them from falling into panic.” The letter also defended quiet action. While “one would expect the whole world to rise and protest,” it said, this was not the case. “Until that time comes, it is the duty of every Jew to protect, if he cannot protest.”\textsuperscript{49} Such a statement could only have incensed boycott leaders.

Within the divided Jewish organizational world, one strategy—refugee aid—provided some common ground. In March 1934 the JDC’s United Jewish Appeal campaign in New York, chaired by Warburg, merged the efforts of the JDC and the American Palestine Campaign. In the following two years it raised more than four million dollars for resettlement. Untermyer, despite earlier refusals, donated generously to the JDC in 1938, stipulating that his money be used only to get people out of Germany. Meanwhile, the JDC, the AJC, and the American Jewish Congress all collaborated in resettling and educating German Jewish children. Felix and Max Warburg cofounded the Council for German Jewry, dedicated to relocating 100,000 German Jewish youth. While its controversial plan to rescue Jews through economic incentives to the Reich never got off the ground, the council did help the JDC and other groups to sponsor exiles.\textsuperscript{50} The level of cooperation regarding refugees was undoubtedly welcome in light of other differences among Jewish organizations. Ultimately, however, not even this work was immune to division.
The Decline of Elite Leadership

Because the United States could not—or would not—absorb many refugees from Germany, the central question became where to send them. For Warburg and the JDC, the answer was simple: anywhere. Working with the League of Nations High Commission for German Refugees, for example, the JDC lobbied countries throughout the Western Hemisphere to open their borders, with little success. The most obvious answer, Palestine, became a divisive one, however. In America, the prospect of a Jewish home in Palestine had generally appealed to poorer and recently arrived Jews. For those who had already established themselves in American society—such as prominent members of the AJC—pushing for a state in Palestine offered more problems than solutions. Many feared that endorsing Zionism would only raise questions of loyalty. Equally important was the fact that Zionist groups constituted new rivals to traditional leadership.51

Since the early 1920s, Warburg had supported Jewish development in Palestine, but he eschewed political Zionism, which he considered antithetical to his assimilationist views. Ever a believer in the power of philanthropy, Warburg thought that generous investment alone might repair Arab-Jewish relations.52 In the 1930s, however, calls for a Jewish state increased in response to Nazism. Zionists consolidated control of both the Jewish Agency for Palestine and Hebrew University, a favorite charity of Warburg’s. As the unofficial leader of the non-Zionists, Warburg remained committed to Arab-Jewish coexistence. Many Zionists, including World Zionist Congress president Chaim Weizmann, increasingly favored a partition of Palestine. Warburg traveled to Zurich in August 1937 to plead his case to the Jewish Agency Council, but his opponents’ momentum was too great, and his efforts failed. Warburg died in October 1937, his plans for compromise in tatters. Warburg’s defeat, along with his death, symbolized a final phase in the transfer of Jewish-American leadership from the traditional elite to large, broad-based, and generally Zionist groups. Still, even Warburg’s critics acknowledged his work on behalf of Jewish communities. Commenting on the philanthropist’s death, Samuel Untermyer reflected that Warburg “could always be counted on” for charitable causes.53

Untermyer, already in poor health, curtailed his activism less than a year after Warburg’s death. It is apparent that, by the late 1930s, he had become alienated from the NSANL. In addition to differences of personality, not all boycott leaders agreed with his insistence on nonsectarianism, and the issue exacerbated existing divisions.54 Already disillusioned by apathy and disunity in December 1937, Untermyer vented his frustrations in his last major public address. He wondered aloud why “Americans generally have been so indolent, callous and short-sighted as to have failed … when they have within easy reach the means of self-protection for themselves and their brethren in Germany.” He resigned as president of the NSANL in April 1938. Until his death in March
1940, he fought to have his name removed from NSANL letterhead, a testament to both his prestige within the boycott movement and his alienation from it.\textsuperscript{55}

\section*{Conclusion}

There has been a long-running scholarly discussion over the failure of American Jews to oppose Nazism effectively.\textsuperscript{56} Historian Gulie Ne’eman Arad has specifically noted the ambivalence of Jewish German-Americans, who misunderstood the threat of Nazism. According to Arad, their position was a mixture of ongoing affinity for the German people and a view of the Jewish people as “eternal,” able to withstand yet another antisemitic regime.\textsuperscript{57} There is much in the stories of Untermyer and the Warburgs to support this assertion. Their identification with Germany, as demonstrated by their actions during and after World War I, informed their disparate reactions to Nazism. The American-born Untermyer based his advocacy of a boycott on the belief that economic pressure would spur the German nation to topple the Hitler regime. Felix Warburg, whose family in Germany made him leery of open confrontation, tried to protect German Jews by defusing tensions and, later, by trying to move them out of harm’s way until the threat passed. Over time, events showed that both men underestimated the Nazis’ staying power.

The careers of Untermyer and Warburg also reflect the weakening of elite leadership styles in Jewish organizational life at the same time that Nazi persecution boosted calls for a Jewish state. Warburg’s attempts to use elite power to protect Reich Jews, effect peace in Palestine, and unify Jewish communities brought hostility from other leaders. Untermyer’s leadership style, along with his commitment to nonsectarianism, similarly fostered infighting. As their stories help to show, the 1930s and 1940s saw the completion of the effort by broad-based groups to supplant the older style of philanthropic leadership.\textsuperscript{58}

One must be careful, however, not to undervalue these leaders’ efforts in the 1930s. While the direct financial impact of the boycott is unclear, a study by Moshe Gottlieb has asserted that damaging the Reich’s economy was but one goal of the boycott. It severed symbolic ties to Germany, he argues, and helped to wrest Jewish-American leadership away from cautious elites. Furthermore, although Untermyer’s efforts did not stop the persecution of Reich Jews, they helped to bring the violence in Germany into the view of the American public, exacerbating a diplomatic problem for the Nazis.\textsuperscript{59}

Nor can one dismiss the less confrontational activities undertaken by figures like Felix Warburg. He broadened the ideological range of support for refugee relief and Palestine aid, just as Untermyer did for the boycott. In addition, the efforts of the Warburg-led JDC yielded quantifiable results. In 1934 the JDC’s United Appeal campaign in New York funded the relocation of 17,000 German Jews. In 1935 the JDC gave nearly $1 million to relief efforts within the Reich and spent approximately the same amount on resettlement. Donations to the
JDC for refugee relief increased every year under Warburg’s leadership, reaching $2,374,062 in 1936. His own timidity and naïveté have brought valid criticism, but no one could deny the impact of a man who, along with his wife, personally donated over $13 million to charity.60

An epilogue to the Warburg story shows that ethnic identity grew more complicated in the late 1930s but that echoes of earlier years remained. A few months after the November 1938 Kristallnacht pogroms in Germany, Max Warburg emigrated to the United States, taking Felix’s place on the JDC’s executive committee. He worked closely with the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation to identify refugee scholars in need of aid, and he stressed the need to show the world “how many Germans … worked for honest democracy.” Felix’s son, Eddie, served intermittently as JDC chair from 1941 to 1965. National Socialism convinced him, like many others, of the need for a Jewish state, and in 1940 he reunited the JDC with the Zionists.61 His cousins James (Paul’s son) and Eric (Max’s son) served in the United States military during World War II. All three cousins lobbied against a harsh peace settlement at the war’s conclusion, and Eric even returned to the board of his family’s firm in Hamburg.62 In the postwar era, at least among the Warburgs, Germanness endured.

Gregory Kupsky is a historian in the World War II section at the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Knox College and a master’s from The University of Tennessee. He received his doctorate in modern U.S. History from The Ohio State University in March 2010. His dissertation was a study of German-American organizations’ responses to National Socialism.

Notes


4Portions of this article draw on chapter one of Gregory Kupsky, “‘The True Spirit of the German People’: German-Americans and National Socialism, 1919–1955,” doctoral dissertation (The Ohio State University, 2010).

5Hasia Diner concedes that the model of two waves, while oversimplified, carries a measure of validity. In her analysis, which is otherwise rich with statistical evidence, Diner does not place specific numbers on the Germanness of the 1820–1880 wave. Presumably because of the problems inherent in trying to quantify a hard-to-define pool of “German Jews,” Diner simply asserts that the 1820–1880 wave “tended to come heavily” from areas that eventually became Germany, or where “an urban elite [was] deeply influenced by German culture.” Diner, The Jews of the United States, 1654 to 2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 79. Elsewhere, Diner has described the German subgroup as a “slim majority” of the pre-1880


11Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation Sixth Annual Report, 30 April 1935, National Carl Schurz Association Papers, Box 44, Folder 2, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (hereafter cited as NCSA); Wilbur Thomas to Dietrich Gristede, 2 December 1935, Box 2, Folder 11, NCSA.


13Hawkins, “Zionist Project,” 114, 116, 119; Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 22; “The Purim Association Ball,” *New York Times* (23 February 1902): 10; Untermyer to Paul Baerwald, 7 May 1920, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 1, AJA. See, for example, the letters in MS-251, Box 3, Folder 4, AJA.


18Hawkins, “Zionist Project,” 115; Untermyer to General Crowder, 27 November 1917, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 4, AJA.

19Untermyer to Frank Cobb, 9 September 1919, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 4, AJA; George Sylvester Viereck to Samuel Untermyer, 1 August 1914, MS-457, Box 166, Folder 1, AJA; Untermyer, “Justice for German-Americans,” *American Weekly* (24 April 1918): 189; “Samuel Untermyer Shows How Germany Was Wronged at Versailles,” *American Monthly* (January 1925): 354. Statement on Untermyer by Jim Larkin, RG 59, Series 1930–1939, Box 4729, Folder 3, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as NARA); Edward Russell, Randolph Guggenheimer, and Samuel Untermyer to Cordell Hull, 11 June 1938, RG 59, Series 1930–1939, Box 1671, File 362.115, NARA; Guggenheimer and Untermyer to State Department, 2 July 1940, and Paul Culbertson to Guggenheimer and Untermyer, 16 July 1940, RG 59, Series 1940–1944, Box 1246, File 362.1143/783, NARA.


21“Mr. Warburg Urges Government Bank,” *New York Times* (14 November 1907): 8; Chernow, 86–90, 130–40; *Der Stürmer* (September 1938), quoted in Chernow, 474; Chernow, 216.

22Chernow, 86, 99–101; JDC Statement on Felix Warburg, January 1917, MS-457, Box 168, Folder 16, AJA.

23Heinrich Charles to Felix Warburg, 10 June 1914, MS-457, Box 165, Folder 1, AJA; J.P. Meyer to Warburg, 28 January 1916, MS-457, Box 168, Folder 15, AJA; Franz Boas to Members of Germanic Society, 15 November 1920, MS-457, Box 188, Folder 4, AJA; Chernow, 168–169.

24Chernow, 181–182, 186–189, 220, 223–224, 246, 249–252; “Warburg a Victim of War Prejudice,” *American Weekly* (18 September 1918): cover. On the Warburgs’ connections to the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, see Guest List, 8 May 1933, Box 1, Folder 3, NCSA; CSMF By-Laws, Box 1, Folder 10, NCSA; and M. Habrich to Helene Wittmann, 11 February 1932, and Joseph Marks to Wilbur Thomas, 27 July 1932, MS-457, Box 285, Folder 3, AJA.


28Untermyer, “Germany’s Medieval Challenge.”


32J.P. Meyer to Warburg, 5 October 1934; Warburg to Meyer, 8 October 1934; and German Society of New York to Warburg, 25 January 1934, MS-457, Box 295, Folder 8, AJA.
33Julius Meier to Warburg, 25 March 1933, and James Rosenberg to Meier, 26 March 1933, MS-457, Box 286, Folder 3, AJA; American Jewish Committee Memo, 28 April 1933, MS-457, Box 286, Folder 6, AJA; Memo of Conversation between Miss Emanuel and William Rosenwald, 21 May 1936, and John Whyte to Miss Emanuel, 5 December 1936, MS-457, Box 321, Folder 7, AJA.

34Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 24, 31; Untermyer, “Celebration of the Dedication Ceremonies Held at the Hebrew University,” 13 April 1933, MS-251, Box 4, Folder 9, AJA.

35Untermyer Statement on the Boycott, 18 September 1933, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 2, AJA.

36Untermyer to George Gordon Battle, 10 April 1935, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 2, AJA; Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 38.

37Jewish War Veterans Message to Ladies’ Auxiliaries, 10 September 1937, Bertha Corets Papers (MS-307), Box 1, Folder 2, AJA; List of Auxiliaries That Did Not Respond to Boycott Questionnaire, undated, Box 1, Folder 5, Ms-307, AJA; Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 27–29, 32.

38Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 39–41; Moshe Gottlieb, American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933–1941: An Historical Analysis (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1981), 226; Minutes of Inter-State Conference of NSANL, 7 March 1937, MS-307, Box 1, Folder 2, AJA.

39Warburg to Hans Meyer, 3 April 1933, MS-307, Box 285, Folder 14, AJA; Chernow, 372–373; Warburg to Louis Rittenberg, 8 August 1933, MS-307, Box 288, Folder 8, AJA; Joseph Proskauer to Committee on Policy, 22 May 1933, and Warburg to Proskauer, 24 May 1933, MS-457, Box 287, Folder 2, AJA; “$2,000,000 Sought to Aid Reich Jews,” New York Times (20 May 1933): 2.

40B’nai B’rith reversed course in 1937, however, and thereafter supported the boycott. Gottlieb, American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 341.

41Statement, “Shall The Jews Engage in an Official Boycott Against Germany?” 17 August 1933, MS-457, Box 287, Folder 1, AJA; Memo, “Counter Boycott Propaganda,” undated, MS-457, Box 286, Folder 8, AJA.

42Hawkins, “Zionist Project,” 121, 132, 134–136, 141; Correspondence between Untermyer and Warburg, June 1935, MS-457, Box 307, Folder 10, AJA; Untermyer to Jonah Wise, 24 November 1933, MS-457, Box 291, Folder 11, AJA.

43Untermyer, “The Economic Boycott of Germany,” 27 June 1933, MS-251, Box 4, Folder 9, AJA.

44“Untermyer Turns Attack upon Hull,” New York Times (4 November 1933): 8; Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 25–26; Untermyer to Samuel Dickstein, 3 May 1934, Samuel Dickstein Papers (MS-8), Box 5, Folder 6, AJA.

45William Dodd to Stephen Wise, 1 August 1933, William Dodd Papers, Box 43, Folder 7, Library of Congress; Dodd to Leo Wormser, 26 September 1933, William Dodd Papers, Box 43, Folder 6, Library of Congress; Cordell Hull to Louis Howe, 6 September 1933, Papers as President, Official File, File 198-a, Box 2, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library.

46The detractors included Rabbi Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress. See the public statement by Felix Warburg, 9 August 1933, Ms-457, Box 285, Folder 14, AJA.


48Warburg to Hans Meyer, 3 April 1933 and 11 April 1933, MS-457, Box 285, Folder 14, AJA; Chernow, 402–403.

49Concert Program, 28 September 1933, MS-457, Box 291, Folder 10; Jonah Wise Fundraising Letter, 23 November 1933, and Form Letter, 28 July 1933, MS-457, Box 291, Folder 11, AJA.


51Chernow, 292–296; Address by Felix Warburg in St. Louis, Missouri, 25 January 1936, MS-457, Box 319, Folder 4, AJA.


55Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 49–50; B. Dubovsky to E.W. Russell, 27 April 1938, and E.W. Russell to NSANL, 28 April 1938, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 2, AJA; Dubovsky to Untermyer, 13 May 1939, and Untermyer to Dubovsky, 11 May 1939, MS-251, Box 1, Folder 3, AJA.


59Hawkins, “‘Hitler’s Bitterest Foe,’” 50; Gottlieb, American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 344–349.


61Chernow, 512, 602; Max Warburg to Wilbur Thomas, 14 September 1944, Box 41, Folder 11, NCSA.